C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14 FEB 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director, Intelligence Community Staff Deputy Director for Intelligence Deputy Director for Operations Deputy Director for Science and Technology Comptroller Director of Communications Director of Security	·
FROM:	Harry E. Fitzwater Deputy Director for Administration	
SUBJECT:	Information Security Oversight Office Inspection	
Office (ISOO) will rebruary through classification of information secument with individual to CIA Information will to CIA Information. 2. The ISO fully cleared.	esentative of the Information Security Oversight Ill inspect selected Agency components during the period August 1985. The inspection will focus on the of Agency documents and the effectiveness of the Agency's arity training program. The ISOO representative wants to idual classifiers, both original and derivative, to determine and the classification process and to review classified coper classification and markings. As in previous years, the be conducted in accordance with the "Procedures for Access ion by ISOO Personnel" (copy attached). Or representative, Harold Mason He has discussed the inspection with members of my staff and desire to visit the components listed below:	25X ⁻
DCI	Intelligence Community Staff (HUMINT Committee) Office of the Comptroller	
DDI	Office of Scientific and Weapons Research	
DDO	One division or staff	
DDS&T	Office of Research and Development	051
DDA	Office of Communications Office of Security (Security Education Group)	'25X
All portions UNC except as mark		25X1 25X1

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3. Please forward by COB 20 February the names of the individuals within		
your components who may be contacted concerning the agenda and dates for the		
ISOO inspection. Responses should be directed to the	25X1	
Agency Security Classification Officer, Information Resources Management		
Division, Office of Information Services, 1236 Ames Building. If you have any		
questions concerning the inspections, please call		
(secure).	່ 25X1	

Harry E. Elizwater

Harry E. Fitzwater

Attachment:
As Stated

Distribution:

Original - IMB Subject

1 - Each Addressee

1 - DDA Chrono

1 - DDA Subject

1 - OIS Chrono

1 - IRMD Chrono

1 - IMB Chrono

PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION BY INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE PERSONNEL

- 1. These procedures, developed through discussion between members of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), General Services Administration, and the Office of Information Services (OIS), Directorate of Administration, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), are established in recognition of the responsibilities of the Director, ISOO to monitor Agency implementation of Executive Order 12356 and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to protect intelligence sources and methods. Access by ISOO personnel to information under CIA's jurisdiction will be governed by these procedures.
- 2. The primary method by which the responsibilities of the DCI and the Director, ISOO will be balanced in order to provide ISOO personnel with appropriate access to CIA information is prescreening. Prescreening means review of CIA information by CIA personnel knowledgeable in its subject matter, prior to granting access to ISOO personnel. During this review, information that reveals intelligence sources or methods may be deleted from any document shown to ISOO personnel. If the information that would remain after deletion is not meaningful or is misleading, the entire document may be withheld.
- 3. ISOO personnel will be granted access to CIA classified information to verify that the information has been properly classified and marked in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12356 and implementing directives. Such information will be reviewed on a sampling basis. ISOO personnel may make unclassified notes sufficient to identify documents on which discrepancies are observed, but they will not include substantive information. Prior to removal from CIA premises, any notes will be reviewed by CIA personnel to ensure that they are unclassified and do not reveal intelligence sources or methods. Classified information or copies of classified documents will not be removed from CIA premises.
- 4. If a question should arise concerning withholding or removal of information, the information will continue to be withheld and to remain on CIA premises, and the question will be resolved between the Director, ISOO and the Director of Information Services (D/OIS). Any formal appeals will be in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12356.
- 5. Any CIA information in the possession, custody, or control of another agency is subject to the "third agency rule." This means that the other agency is not authorized to provide ISOO access to the information without prior CIA approval. Requests for approval must be directed to D/OIS, and any access to such information normally will be limited to copies held on CIA premises. The same rule applies to any information of another agency in the possession, custody, or control of CIA.

- 6. In addition to the above provisions, access to CIA information by ISOO personnel will be granted only upon CIA verification that their security clearances, SCI clearances, and CIA liaison clearances are appropriate in each case to the information subject to review.
- 7. The arrangements for visits to CIA by ISOO personnel will be made in the following manner: ISOO will provide OIS, in advance of any visit, an outline of specific interests and the amount of time to be spent on each. D/OIS will respond with a proposed agenda, coordinated within CIA, specifying times and places for access, and any anticipated problems. Agreement on the details of the visit will be reached between ISOO and OIS, and an OIS representative will accompany the ISOO personnel during their visit.
- 8. Prior to publication, any ISOO inspection report that includes CIA information and is to be made public will be reviewed by CIA personnel. This review will be for security purposes only to ensure that the report is unclassified and does not reveal intelligence sources or methods.